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INTERNATIONAL  NEGOTIATIONS  ON  FARM  SUPPORT  LEVELS: 
THE  ROLE  OF  PSEs 
I.  Introduction 
Negotiations will start shortly on  making  domestic 
agricultural price policies more  compatible with  a  well-
functioning agricultural trading system.  A  major objective 
of the negotiations,  confirmed by the  OECD  Ministerial 
Meeting  on  May  12-13,  1987,  is to achieve  a  progressive 
reduction of agricultural support.  One  requirement of such 
negotiations is to have  an  empirical  approach to clarify 
objectives  and to monitor progress.  In this context the use 
of  Producer Subsidy Equivalents  (PSEs),  as  recently employed 
by the  OECD  in its Trade Mandate  Study,  has  been widely 
discussed. 
This article examines  the concept,  possible uses,  and 
issues of measurement  of  PSEs  in light of the Uruguay  Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations.  Among  the most 
difficult measurement  issues are policy coverage,  the 
treatment of  supply control policies,  and the use of world 
prices  and  exchange rates.  Also discussed are the 
relationship between this measure  and  others used  in 
previous  GATT  rounds  and possible institutional arrangements 
that might facilitate agreed measurement. II 
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II.  The  Concept 
The  concept of  a  Producer Subsidy Equivalent is 
straightforward":  it is the  subsidy that would  be necessary 
to replace the array of actual  farm  policies  employed  in a 
particular country  in order to leave  farm  income  unchanged. 
It can be  thought of as the  "cash"  value of policy transfers 
occasioned by price and  non-price means.  The  main  purpose 
of the measure  is to aggregate  in  a  manageable  way  a  wide 
range of different price and  non-price policies whose 
effects otherwise are not  comparable. 
The  use of  PSEs  does  not itself imply  endorsement  of 
any particular policy instrument.  The  PSE  measure  can 
include the transfer effects of any policy that can be 
linked directly to  farm  incomes,  including input and  factor 
market policies,  direct transfers,  price supports,  and trade 
measures.  Similarly,  the measure  can be applied to any 
level  of government--local,  regional,  national,  and 
supranational.  In practice,  the context in which it is used 
will determine the comprehensiveness  of the actual policy 
measures  to be  aggregated into PSEs. 
As  originally developed by josling for  FAO  (FAO:  1973, 
1975),  the measurement  was  geared essentially to expressing 
the effects of all policies that could reasonably be  thought 
to be  commodity  specific.  The  OECD,  in its Trade Mandate 
Study  (OECD;  1987),  broadened the definition by  including 
more  general measures  like government  expenditure  on 
research,  which  are not necessarily commodity  specific.  The 3 
USDA,  in its recent analysis of  PSEs  in a  large number  of 
countries  (USDA:  1987),  broadened the definition further  by 
including  some  of the effects of exchange  rate distortions 
in the case of developing countries. 
For use  in trade negotiations,  however,  the definition 
may  have to be  more  narrow  in order to exclude  government 
policies that have  no  (or only  a  negligible)  direct  impact 
on trade  flows.  Moreover,  the existence of supply contro_ 
policies will have to be  taken  into account  for political 
for  no  other reason  (Tangermann:  1986).  (These  issues will 
be discussed  in more detail below.)  However,  even with  a 
more  narrow definition,  PSEs  would still have the major 
advantage  over other measures that they would  include the 
effects of all trade  impacting domestic measures,  as well  as 
"gray area"  measures  (such as variable levies  and state 
trading),  which play an  overwhelming role in agricultural 
policies and trade but have  so  far essentially remained 
outside of effective GATT  discipline. 
The  PSE  is calculated by  commodity  and  evaluated in the 
first place as  an  absolute  sum  of money  (say,  million 
dollars)  representing the total value of transfers received 
by  producers of that commodity.  The  PSE  can then be 
expressed in relation to several bases: 
- PSE  per unit of output  (usually tons),  by dividing 
absolute  PSE  value by the quantity produced; 
- PSE  as  a  percent of domestic production valued 
at domestic prices; p, 
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- PSE  as  a  percent of domestic production 
valued at world prices. 
In the third case the  PSE  is comparable to an  ad 
valorem tariff,  since such  a  tariff is also expressed as  a 
percent of world prices.  It is similar to  an  "adjusted 
nominal"  rate of protection,  where  the adjustments  cover all 
included input subsidies.  The  PSE  could also be  defined as 
a  percentage of actual net  farm  income;  such  a  definition 
would  give  an  indication of  income-dependency.  It could 
also be defined  as  a  percentage of net  farm  income at world 
prices,  and hence  be  similar to the concept  of an effective 
rate of protection adjusted for measured  factor market 
policies.  These variations will not be discussed here.  In 
what  follows,  "PSE",  unless  otherwise specified,  will be 
defined as the transfer per unit  expressed as  a  percent of 
world prices. 
It is also possible to aggregate  PSEs  across 
commodities  in order to estimate the total value of 
transfers to the  farming  industry.  Such measures  may  have  a 
place when  discussing the level of protection in the sector 
as  a  whole.  However,  the discussion that follows  focuses 
mainly  on the calculation of  PSEs  by  commodity. 
One  important characteristic of  PSEs  is that their 
definition is inherently flexible.  One  can decide to 
include all government policies or to exclude certain policy 
instruments.  For domestic purposes,  all income-transfering 
policies might  be  included in order to illustrate the total 5 
impact of policies on  agricultural  incomes.  If PSEs  were  to 
be  used  in multilateral trade negotiations,  there would  have 
to be  international  agreement  on  which policies to  include 
in the measurement  of  PSEs.  It is likely,  for  instance, 
that  a  definition would  be  chosen  such that only trade 
distorting pOlicies would  be  included,  since in 
international negotiations the principal  interest is trade 
implications rather than  income  transfers. , ' 
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III.  possible Uses  of  PSEs  in Trade Negotiations 
PSEs  have  so  far been used mainly  as  a  tool  for policy 
analysis  (see,  for  instance,  Josling:  (1980,1981).  However, 
there is now  active discussion of using this concept as  a 
basis of  commitments  in trade negotiations.  This  could be 
done  in  a  wide variety of ways.  In particular,  PSEs  could 
either sUbstitute for,  or be  combined with,  more  traditional 
GATT  negotiating measures  in a  number  of ways. 
On  the one  end  of this  spectrum,  PSEs  could be  made  the 
central  (if not the  only)  medium  of  GATT  commitments  and 
disciplines in agriculture;  PSEs  would  then essentially 
SUbstitute for traditional  GATT  rules  in agriculture.  Rules 
and disciplines on  the use of particular policy instruments 
(like  import restrictions or export subsidies)  would  no 
longer be required.  Instead,  all commitments  and 
disciplines would  be defined just in terms  of  PSEs.  In 
particular,  after multilateral agreement were  reached  on  the 
definition of  PSE  measurement,  all participating parties 
would  bind their existing PSEs,  very much  like tariff 
bindings.  Negotiations  could then be held on  gradual  and 
balanced reductions of  PSEs. 
Such negotiations  on  PSE  reductions  could be pursued in 
different ways,  just as negotiations  on tariff cuts have  in 
the past adopted different approaches.  A wholesale  approach 
would  be  a  multilateral agreement to reduce all  (commodity 
specific percentage)  PSEs  in all participating countries 
according to  a  common  formuia.  O~e of the tariff cutting 7 
f.ormulas  considered during the  Tokyo  Round  (Senti:  1986,  pp. 
85-87,  and  Cline,  et al:  1978),  for  example  the  Swiss 
formula,  could be  chosen,  or  a  new  formula  could be 
negotiated. 1  The  nature of the  formula  adopted would  then 
implicitly express the  approach  toward  a  balanced reduction 
of agricultural support.  The  "graduality"  of  PSE  reductions 
would  have to be  determined  in terms  of the time period over 
which  reductions  are to take place. 
A different approach would  be  a  request  and offer 
procedure like that used  for tariff negotiations  in earlier 
GATT  rounds.  Individual  countries would  establish lists of 
requests  and offers for  PSE  reductions  for  individual 
commodities  in individual countries.  The  final  outcome  of 
such negotiations would  lead to new  PSE  bindings. 
In both of these  approaches  the  commodity  coverage 
would also be subject to negotiation.  PSE  bindings and 
1  The  "Swiss  formula"  for tariff reductions  can be 
expressed as: 
where  to  is the initial PSE  level 
t1  is the  new  PSE  level 
and  a  is an negotiated coefficient. 
A value of  0.5  for  "a"  gives  a  sUbstantial  reduction to high 
PSEs  and  could provide  a  credible target over  a  5-year 
period. 
A  specific question would  be  how  to treat negative  PSEs 
which exist,  for  example,  in a  number  of developing 
countries.  One  possibility would  be to disregard negative 
PSEs  altogether,  in the sense that they would  not be  bound. 
This  could be  agreed  on  the grounds that negative  PSEs  do 
not harm the interests of other contracting parties which 
export agricultural  commodities,--" 
8 
reductions  could be  agreed  for  only  a  small  number  of core 
agricultural  commodities  or comprehensively  for all  farm 
products.  If only  a  selected number  of  commodities  were  made 
the subject of such  PSE  commitments,  the  remaining 
commodities  would  then continue to be  covered by  existing 
(or modified)  GATT  disciplines. 
A modification of this commodity-specific approach 
could be that aggregate  PSEs  across all,  or a  selected list 
of,  agricultural  commodities  would  be  bound  and later 
reduced.  Countries would  then remain  free  as  to how  they 
wanted to allocate their overall  PSE  allowance to individual 
commodities.  They  could,  for  example,  increase their PSEs  on 
wheat if only they reduced sufficiently their PSEs  on dairy 
commodities.  This  approach  would  allow for more  flexibility 
in domestic policies and  for reacting to specific commodity 
needs. 2 
If bindings  and  reductions of  PSEs  were  agreed,  they 
could in principle replace all other GATT  disciplines for 
agricultural products.  One  could argue that,  if PSEs  were 
bound,  there would  be  no  need  for minimum  access  commitments 
or equitable share disciplines.  The  PSE  binding would 
ensure that governments  could not pursue expansionary 
policies that could displace exports of other countries.  For 
bound tariffs  (to which  bound  PSEs  would  analogous)  the Gatt 
2  It would,  however,  imply the danger that new  inter-
commodity distortions are created.  Given close 
substitutability among  many  agricultural products,  in both 
production and  consumption,  this qanger must not be 
overlooked. 9 
does  not provide  for  such additional disciplines.  A  major 
advantage  of  such  an  approach would  be that market  forces, 
in particular shifting comparative advantages,  would  then be 
allowed to  influence trade  flows  -- much  more  so than if 
disciplines relating to trade quantities were  superimposed 
on  the trading system. 
On  the other hand,  it could also be possible to  combine 
PSE  bindings with existing  (or modified)  GATT  disciplines 
for agricultural  t~~de,  in particular the disciplines of 
Articles  XI  and  xv:.  The  principle would  be that whatever 
is truly binding in any particular case --the PSE  binding 
or the traditional  GATT  discipline -- would  have to be 
respected by  the country concerned.  For  example,  an 
exporting country would  have to respect its PSE  binding as 
long as its exports did not  exceed the equitable share. 
However,  if the country nonetheless were to export more  than 
its equitable share,  it would  have to respect the equitable 
share discipline.  The  advantage of such  an  approach would  be 
that it would  seem to provide more  "security".  The  drawback, 
however,  would  be that all the difficulties the  GATT  has  so 
far had with its disciplines in agricultural trade would 
continue to prevail.  Moreover,  such  an  approach would  be 
less market oriented than  a  "pure"  PSE  approach. 
One  further step away  from  substituting PSEs  for 
traditional GATT  disciplines would  be to use  the  PSE 
approach  for  only certain GATT  disciplines,  while other 
issues are left to be  regulated under traditional GATT 10 
rules.  For  example,  it could be  agreed that  PSE  bindings 
would  apply  only to exported  commodities,  while  imports 
would  remain  subject to traditional  GATT  disciplines.  While 
such  an  approach  may  be  a  way  to handle  the most pressing 
problems  in agricultural trade,  it would  imply the danger 
that imbalances  are created in terms  of different stringency 
of  GATT  obligations  for different countries. 
Even  further  away  from  replacing traditional  GATT  rules 
by  PSE  disciplines would  be  an  approach by  which  PSEs  are 
used  only  for measuring the status quo  and  for defining the 
extent to which policies have to be  adjusted,  whereas 
commitments  would  then be defined in terms  of policies 
rather than in terms  of  PSEs.  After measuring existing PSEs, 
countries would  have to reach  agreement  on  how  much  PSEs 
should be  reduced  (for example  by  applying something like a 
tariff cutting formula).  Negotiations  could then take place 
on  the way  in which  individual policy measures  should be 
adjusted to effect the  intended  PSE  reductions.  For  example, 
it could be  agreed that a  given country should reduce its 
domestic  support price for  a  given commodity  by  x  percent, 
or its export subsidy for another commodity  by  y  dollars per 
ton,  or should-expand its import  quota  for yet another 
commodity  by  z  tons,  in order to reduce the respective  PSE 
by  the  amount  agreed.  The  new  domestic  support price,  the 
new  export subsidy,  or the  new  import  quota  could then be 
bound. 11 
This  ar  ~ach would  have  the  advantage that the 
discipline~~uld be directly defined  in terms  of observable 
and  contrc_~able policy measures  and that problems 
potentially resulting  from  fluctuating world market prices 
and  exchange rates would  be  avoided.  On  the other hand,  it 
would  not  always  be  easy to determine unequivocally by  how 
much  the policy instruments would  have  to be  changed  in 
order to achieve the  intended  PSE  reduction.  Quantitative 
restrictions would  pose particular problems;  in order to 
translate quotas  into  PSE  changes  one  would  have to estimate 
parameters  or to make  assumptions  on price elasticities. 
Moreover,  the potential of  a  more  "pure"  PSE  approach  in 
terms  of leading to more  world market stability  (see below) 
would  not be realized.  Finally,  such  an  approach would  leave 
less flexibility for domestic policy choice. 
At  the far  end of this spectrum of substituting PSEs 
for or combining  them with more  traditional  GATT  rules  and 
disciplines is the suggestion to use  PSEs  only as monitoring 
devices.  Obligations  and  commitments  would  continue to be 
defined in terms  of existing or modified  GATT  rules and 
disciplines.  PSEs  would  be  used only as  a  starting point 
and  an  information base  for traditional negotiations  and  as 
a  way  of monitoring progress  in achieving the negotiating 
objectives.  PSEs  would  then still serve the purpose of 
creating more  transparency in agricultural policies.  But 
using PSEs  solely as measures  of the effects of policy 
transfers would  not  change the  GATT  negotiating process. 12 
IV.  The  Measurement  of  PSEs 
If PSEs  were  to be  used  in international trade 
negotiations,  their definition and  measurement  would  have  to 
be tailored to that particular purpose.  International 
agreement  on  measurement  principles would  require  a  process 
of negotiations,  which  in itself could be difficult and  time 
consuming.  However,  given the potential advantages  of the 
use  of  PSEs  -- and  in view of the lack of success of 
traditional  GATT  approaches  in agriculture -- such pre-
negotiations could well  be  worth the effort. 
Negotiations  on  the definition and  measurement  of PSEs 
could start from  a  number  of basic premises which  could well 
facilitate agreement.  These  premises  are: 
- Complete  accuracy is neither achievable nor necessary. 
Even  less than completely accurate definitions would help to 
establish more  stringent disciplines than so  far exist for 
agricultural policies. 
- Political agreement  reached in the negotiations,  and 
the resulting will to accept commitments,  is more  important 
than full quantitative accuracy  and  precise conformity with 
economic  theory. 
- There is always  the possibility of  (and there will, 
after experience has  been gained,  be the need  for)  revision 
of definitions and  methods  of measurement. 
- Scope  for sUbstitution exists  between definitions and 
methods  of  PSE  measurement  and the ways  in which  rules  and 13 
disciplines  for policy behavior are specified. 
The  following discussion of  issues  in measurement  and 
rule definition is essentially based  on  a  "pure"  PSE 
approach of binding  and  then reducing  PSEs.  However,  most  of 
this discussion would  apply if PSEs  instead were  combined 
with traditional  GATT  approaches. 
PSEs  are not difficult to calculate,  given the 
availability of  good  information  on  national policies and 
prices  and  agreed procedures  for dealing with certain 
empirical  issues.  But  since  some  of these measurement 
issues have  an  important bearing on  the interpretation and 
use  of  PSEs,  they are dealt with  in detail below. 
The  three most  important measurement  issues  facing the 
use of  PSEs  in trade negotiations are the question of policy 
coverage,  the treatment of supply control policies,  and the 
issue of variable exchange rates and world prices.  In all 
three instances the issues  involve both technical  and 
political choices.  The  appropriate way  to measure policy 
effects depends  crucially on  the use to which the measure 
will be put.  The  flexibility of the  PSE  concept makes it 
particularly  useful  for purposes  of political negotiation. 
This  flexible nature of  PSEs  is illustrated in the  followinq 
discussion. 
a)  Policy Coverage 
The  PSE  approach to the measurement  of protection has 
the ability to include  a  wide  range of policies at different ,  , 
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levels of government.  Unlike measures  that rely solely on 
comparing domestic with world prices,  PSEs  can deal with 
non-price policies  and with those that operate through  input 
and  factor markets.  This ability to be  comprehensive also 
tends to complicate measurement.  The  solution is presumably 
to reach  agreement  on criteria for  inclusion or exclusion 
and  to set up  a  system to monitor adherence to these 
guidelines.  If PSEs  were  to be  used  in international 
discussions,  procedures  for measurement  would  have to be 
agreed  in advance  and the  institutional support would  have 
to be provided for their periodic updating and 
dissemination. 
The  primary criterion for deciding which policy 
instruments to include should be the desirability,  from  an 
international perspective,  of discouraging use of those 
instruments  as  providers  of agricultural protection.  One 
could think of  a  simple categorization of policy instruments 
along the  following lines: 
List A: 
List  B: 
those that are  "pure"  transfers,  agreed 
to have either zero or only negligible output 
and trade effects, 
or  "pure"  stabilization payments  with  no  net 
transfers over time; 
those that encourage  output directly or 
indirectly through the increase  in  farm 
profitability without  concommitant  supply 
control; List c: 
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those that involve  supply control, 
with or without payments,  and  quantitative 
measures  with similar output-restraining effects. 
The  policies in List A  could be  ignored if PSEs  are to 
be  used  for  international trade or policy negotiations.  This 
should  encourage the  "decoupling".of support payments  from 
price levels.  For List  B policies,  negotiation on  the basis 
of the  implied  PSEs  would directly  improve  the trading 
system.  List B  policies should therefore  form  the core of 
PSE  measurement  in a  multilateral negotiations context. 
There will be  a  number  of policies where  allocation to 
List~ or List  B  is not unequivocally clear.  Difficulties 
are,  in particular,  created by policies which are not 
commodity  specific but still increase overall profitablity 
of  farming activities.  In these cases pragmatic decisions 
will have to be taken at the prenegotiation stage.  At  the 
end of such negotiations more  or less comprehensive lists of 
policies would  be established,  allocating instruments to 
categories A  and  B. 
The  principal problems  arise with List C policies,  as 
would  be true for  any  similar aggregative measure  of 
expressing protection,  such as  nominal  protection rates, 
"montants  de  soutien",  effective protection rates,  or the 
level of domestic prices.  The  problems  are in part economic 
and  in part political.  The  solutions,  discussed in the 
next section,  must  therefore be both technically feasible 
and politically acceptable. 16 
b)  Supply control  Policies 
If domestic production is effectively restricted 
through  supply control policies,  countries  should receive 
negotiating  "credits"  on the  PSEs  for the commodities 
concerned.  There are  two  reasons  why  such credits should be 
granted.  First,  if effective supply control is in place, 
the total transfer to producers  as measured  by traditional 
PSEs  overestimates the effect on  quantities produced  and 
hence  on trade.  Part of the transfer to producers  in this 
case is pure  "economic  rent"  to which  producers  cannot react 
by  expanding production because of the supply restriction. 
However,  in trade negotiations it would  presumably be  only 
the trade  impacting fraction of  support that should be  bound 
and  made  subject of negotiations. 
Second,  countries pursuing supply control policies do 
indeed make  a  "contribution" to balancing international 
markets,  even if the primary objective of supply controls is 
domestic,  such as  to effect budget savings.  From  a  purely 
economic  point of view,  supply controls lead to domestic 
inefficiencies in resource use.  However,  from  an 
international trade perspective supply control policies  (in 
countries that support their agricultural sectors)  make  a 
positive contribution by  reducing  "overproduction"  and  hence 
limiting the distortion of international trade that would 
otherwise occur.  If countries pursuing such policies were 
not to receive  "credits"  inPSE  m~asurement,  they would  not 17 
b.e  treated in  a  balanced or fair way.  Hence,  such countries 
would  probably  find it difficult to accept  PSEs  as  a  basis 
for trade negotiations. 
For these reasons  countries pursuing supply control 
policies should receive  some  deductions  of their measured 
commodity  PSEs.  The  question,  though,  is by  how  much  the 
PSEs  should be  reduced  in order to take into account the 
effect of supply control policies. 
Ideally,  the  PSE  for  a  product under  supply control 
should be  reduced exactly by the part of the overall  amount 
of support that is above  the support which would  have 
sufficed to  induce  farmers  to produce the quantity supplied 
under the supply control  scheme.  In order to do  this 
properly,  the  "shadow price"  for the  commodity  concerned 
would  have to be  estimated. 3  This price cannot be observed 
statistically,  since the working of the supply control 
obscures actual producer incentives. 
There are various ways  in which the  shadow price could 
be estimated empirically,  either on  the basis of market 
information  (in particular where  quotas  are tradable)  or 
through more  sophisticated econometric methods  (in 
particular those based on duality theory).  However,  in most 
cases  such methods  are either too  complex or too  ambiguous 
in their results to be  successfully used as  a  basis for 
3  The  shadow price is the domestic producer price that would 
have  determined  the quantitities-actually produced in the 
absence of any  form  of supply control. ,  \ 
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international trade negotiations.  Hence,  more  simple  and 
straightforward approaches  should be  chosen. 
Two  possibilities are available.  First,  one  could 
define  a  limited number  of categories of supply control 
policies and  agree  on  flat rate percentage reductions  of the 
PSEs  as traditionally measured  for these categories  (say, 
10,  20,  and  30  percent reductions).  Supply control policies 
as  pursued  in individual cases would  then have  to be 
allocated to these categories according to simple  and 
unequivocal criteria.  These criteria should create a 
ranking of supply control policies with regard to the degree 
of their effect  (i.e.,  the extent to which they reduce 
domestic production below what  would  have  been produced in 
the absence  of the policies concerned).  It may  be possible, 
though it certainly would be difficult,  to agree  on  such 
criteria. 
A  second approach is based on the "self-election" of 
the countries concerned  and provides political incentives to 
make  contributions to  improving the situation in 
international trade.  countries that believe they pursue 
effective supply control policies could be granted  a  given 
percentage reduction of the  PSE  concerned  (say  30  percent) 
if they would  agree to bind the absolute  PSE  value  (in 
million dollars)  rather than,  as  otherwise,  to bind the 
percentage  PSE.  The  result of this approach would be that 
such countries,  as  long as  they do  not  expand the volume  of 
domestic production,  would  then be  subject to the equivalent 19 
price disciplines  (in  PSE  per ton)  as  in all other cases. 
However,  if the country concerned were to allow domestic 
production to  increase,  it would  have to bring down  its PSE 
per ton  in order to  comply with the overall  PSE  value  bound 
for the  commodity under consideration. 
If countries believe that their supply control policies 
are effective,  they  should not  experience major difficulties 
with this approach.  If they are less sure about their own 
policies,  they would  be  free  to choose  the percentage  PSE 
{rather than the absolute value  PSE) ,  although by doing so 
they would  forego  the supply control  "credit".  The great 
advantage  of such  a  method  is that there would  be  no  heed to 
determine at the  international level whether  in any 
particular case  a  supply control policy is actually 
restricting domestic production effectively.  The  government 
of the country concerned could make  its own  choice under 
this "self-election"  approach. 4 
c)  Consumer Effects of Policies 
The  calculations of the extent of protection employed 
by  the  FAO,  the  OECD,  and the USDA  make  a  clear distinction 
between the effects  on  the producer  (PSE)  and that on the 
consumer.  This  consumer effect is called the  "Consumer 
4  The  credit percentages  for this approach would  be  open to 
negotiation and  could vary  from  case to case,  depending  on 
the extent to which the supply control is thought to reduce 
domestic production .. The  danger of  a  deadlock in 
negotiations  on the credit percentage is small  since the 
country concerned could,  if it were  not happy with the 
credit percentage,  always  opt  for the usual percent  PSE 
rather than  for the  reduced  absolute  PSE. I  . 
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Subsidy Equivalent"  (eSE)  and  is defined in an  analogous 
way.  The  eSE  measures  the extent to which  expenditure  on 
food  consumption  is subsidized by  government policies.5  To 
arrive at an  indication of the trade  impacts  of protection, 
consumption effects are as  necessary as  production effects. 
For  a  simple tariff the  two  effects will be  linked:  the one 
may  be taken as  an  indication of the other.  Measuring the 
price advantage gained by the tariff to producers will also 
give the degree of disprotection afforded to consumers.  By 
contrast,  a  deficiency payment policy deliberately changes 
the producer price relative to the  consumer price of  a 
product.  For  many  agricultural policies the distinction 
between producer and  consumer  impacts  is likely to be 
significant. 
The  issue to be  faced  in trade negotiations is whether, 
and to what  extent,  to incorporate these consumer policy 
effects along with those on production incentives.  Though 
logic would  suggest  a  completely parallel treatment of 
consumer  impacts,  in practical terms this may  not be 
necessary.  If farm  support policies were  bound,  as 
suggested above,  on the basis of PSEs,  there may  be  no 
particular need to bind  eSEs  as well.  Reductions  in 
producer subsidies would  tend to lower the taxes  on 
consumption  (if border measures  or domestic purchasing 
programs  were  employed)  or leave  them unaffected  (if 
deficiency payments  or other direct producer subsidies were 
5  For developed countries,  the  eSE is usually  a  negative 
amount,  as  a  result of higher consumer prices. 21 
in use).  Where  such direct producer subsidies grant  some 
implicit benefit to consumers,  through the  lowering of 
market prices  (at home  or internationally),  those subsidies 
will also be  lowered  by  a  general  roll-back of  PSEs.  Though 
countries  should be  encouraged to reduce  consumer taxation, 
and  thus  expand markets,  much  of this will  occur pari passu 
with the reduction  in protection to producers. 
One  qualification should be  added  to this suggestion to 
de-emphasize  CSEs.  It would  be desirable to dissuade 
countries  from  moving  from  support  systems with benign 
consumer effects  (such as deficiency payments)  to those 
which  tax consumers  (such as  import levies and  export 
subsidies).  To  this extent,  countries should get "credit" 
for having  CSEs  lower  (in absolute terms)  than their PSEs. 
Moreover,  any policy change that moves  toward  a  lower 
consumer burden  for  any given level of producer support 
should be  "rewarded"  in negotiating terms. 6 
One  radically different approach to the issue of  CSEs 
should be mentioned,  even if only to dismiss it as  academic 
rambling.  Suppose  one  calculated CSEs  for all products  and 
agreed to bind and  reduce all negative  CSEs  regardless of 
producer subsidy levels.  This  would  change the whole  nature 
of the debate.  countries would be meeting to reduce 
consumer  food  taxes,  not  farm price levels.  Farm policies 
would  continue but under the constraint that the taxpayers, 
6  The  special case of relieving the  "burden"  on  livestock 
producers  as  "consumers"  of  feed_is  discussed below. 22 
not the consumers,  would  make  the politically-determined 
transfers.  Trade  would still be distorted to the extent 
that production  incentives were  given.  But  the limits on 
such distortion would  be direct and  stringent.  Producers 
would  have  full  access to foreign markets  but  compete with 
subsidized domestic  production.  The  ultimate  issue is 
whether  such  a  system of transparent domestic  producer 
subsidies would  be better than the present mix  of trade 
barriers and  export subsidies.  If so,  a  direct assault on 
CSEs,  rather than  PSEs,  would  be worth consideration. 
d)  The  Treatment of Animal  Feed  Costs  in PSEs 
One  issue of considerable significance is the 
measurement  of  PSEs  in the treatment of animal  feed 
policies.  High prices for  feedstuffs clearly act as 
negative subsidies  (i.e.,  taxes)  on the livestock industry. 
They  would  therefore normally be  taken into account  in the 
calculation of PSEs  for livestock activities.  To  omit these 
policies  from  the calculations would  overstate the incentive 
effect of high support levels for livestock product prices, 
much  of which might merely offset higher  feed  costs. 
Previous  measurement  efforts have  not always  followed this 
precept. and  hence  have  overstated PSEs  in certain cases. 
It is equally clear that any  calculation of  CSEs  must 
also  include  intermediate consumption,  in the animal  feed 
industry,  as  a  part of the total consumption  impact.  Trade 
patterns will be  influenced by both the  impact  on  livestock 23 
production and  on  feed use.  Livestock production levels are 
influenced by  purchased  feed  costs,  relative to the price of 
the output,  and  the use  of  an  ingredient  in purchased  feed 
is in turn  influenced by its price relative to other 
ingredients  and  to the profitability of the livestock 
enterprise.  PSEs  and  CSEs  used  for trade negotiations  need 
to account  for  each of these effects.  IF  the  PSEs  and  CSEs 
are used as  -ansfer measures,  care  should be taken not to 
double-coun- :he effect of  feed  ingr~dient price policies. 
The  "tax"  on  livestock "consumers"  of high corn prices,  for 
instance,  is already measured  in the negative  impact  on 
livestock farmers'  income. 
Countries that have high prices  for livestock feed 
ingredients,  such as grain,  should be  given the incentive to 
reduce those prices to encourage more  consumption.  If PSEs 
on  livestock include  allowance  for the tax-effect of  feed 
prices,  such  PSEs  will  increase when  feed prices go  down. 
This will put pressure on countries to reduce  livestock 
prices along with those  for  feed  ingredients.  Thus, 
additional trade distortions which might otherwise arise 
will be  avoided.  By  contrast,  if feed  costs are omitted 
from  livestock PSEs,  then the  incentives to livestock 
production are not adequately captured.  Changes  in  feed 
prices would  not appear to change  livestock protection, 
though  in practice one  knows  that it would. 7 
7  The  only  argument  for omitting such elements  in the 
calculation is the possible difficulty of obtaining average 
feed  use statistics for  individual  livestock types  by /\ 
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e)  Large-Country Effects 
PSEs  as traditionally measured  do  not explicitly take 
into account the effects of large countries'  policies  on 
world market prices  (USDA:  1987,  p.  27).  For  example,  if a 
large country protects domestic producers  and  expands 
production,  this will tend to depress world prices.  Since 
the  PSE  estimate would  be based  (directly or indirectly)  on 
actual world prices,  it would  include not only the policy 
induced domestic price increase but also the resulting world 
market price reduction.  It would  in this sense be 
"exaggerated".  Conversely,  when  a  large country controls 
domestic  supplies,  world prices are higher than they would 
have  been  in the absence  of these supply controls  (although 
still lower than if the country had not pursued 
protectionist policies in the first place). 
One  could argue that the inclusion of world price 
effects should be  avoided  and that the  PSEs  of large 
countries should be  adjusted for their world price effects. 
However,  there are  two  reasons  why  such adjustments would  be 
neither necessary nor justified.  First,  in negotiations  and 
agreements  on tariff reductions  large-country effects are 
not taken into account,  even  though  large countries'  tariffs 
also have  depressing effects on world prices.  Second,  large 
countries have particular responsibilities for the 
functioning  of international trade.  If they pursue policies 
country.  It might  be  necessary to use  "rules of thumb"  if 
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that depress world prices,  there is no  good  negotiating 
reason  why  this should not  be measured.  If,  on  the other 
hand,  they control domestic  supplies,  world market prices 
are  somewhat  less depressed.  This will also be reflected in 
the  PSE  measure,  which will be  lower  in such cases.  There 
is no  reason to give the country  "additional credit."  For 
both these reasons  PSEs  should not  be  adjusted for  large-
country effects on  world prices. 
f)  Voluntary Export Restraints  and  Reference  Prices 
Some  instruments  of protection against  imports  lead to 
higher cif prices.  This  is certainly the case for voluntary 
export restraint agreements  (VERAs)  and  orderly marketing 
agreements. 8  The protectionist effects of such measures 
are not gauged by  PSEs  (or by  any similar indicator based  on 
budget  information in the  importing country or on cif price 
information).  Indeed,  replacement of,  say,  an  import tariff 
by  an  equivalent VERA  would  lead to  a  reduction in the  PSE 
as usually measured,  without reducing protection for 
domestic producers.  Hence,  an  agreement to bind  and  reduce 
PSEs  might  induce governments  of  importing countries to 
switch  from tariffs and  other  forms  of  import protection to 
VERAs  and  other measures that "disguise" protection.  It 
would,  therefore,  be desirable to include the effects of 
such measures  in the measurement  of PSEs. 
8  It may  also happen under  "reference price"  schemes,  such 
as  those used by the  EC  in its fruit and vegetables market 
regimes,  if exporting countries establish export monopolies 
to make  sure that the reference prices are not undercut. " 
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One  way  of doing this is to compare  domestic prices 
with  international prices.  Generally  one  would  use  observed 
cif prices  in these cases.  However,  this would  not work  in 
the case of VERAs,  since cif prices are distorted as  a 
result of the policy itself.  Hence,  estimates of the  "true" 
cif price would  have  to be  based  on cif prices of the  same 
commodity  in other  importing countries whose  comparable 
imports were  not subject to such measures.  Such price 
information could be  offered,  in the process  of measuring 
and  reviewing  PSEs,  by these other importing countries. 
Alternatively,  the exporting countries themselves  could 
offer information on  the extent to which prices are 
distorted as  a  result of the policies under consideration. 
In order to avoid  lengthy debates  on the appropriate 
adjustment of  PSEs  a  general  "rule of  thumb"  could be 
included whenever  such policies are in existence.  The  PSE 
(as traditionally measured)  of the commodity  concerned would 
be  increased by  x  percent  (say,  30  percent)  automatically, 
unless the  importing country were  to provide evidence that a 
lower  increase is justified.  This  approach would  not  reduce 
the difficulty of making  an appropriate estimate of the 
"true" cif price.  However,  it would place the burden of 
proof  on  the  importing country concerned,  and it would  in 
that sense make  the collection of  information easier. 27 
g)  World  Price  and  Exchange  Rate  Fluctuations 
Complications  in  implementing a  PSE  approach  in 
international trade negotiations would  arise because  of 
fluctuations  in world prices  and  exchange  rates.  These 
fluctuations  do  not cause serious measurement  problems, 
since average values  for the period concerned are used  in 
calculating PSEs.  Important  issues relate rather to the 
acceptability of  PSE-based disciplines and to the compliance 
with  such disciplines.  In particular,  what  happens  if PSEs 
increase not because of policy changes  in the country 
concerned but because  of  falling world prices or because of 
exchange rate changes?  Would  domestic prices  (or subsidies) 
then have to be brought  down  in order to comply with the 
bound  PSEs? 
In one  sense,  this is exactly what  should occur. 
Tariffs,  the basic  GATT  instrument,  do  not provide 
protection against fluctuating world market prices and 
exchange rates.  Moreover,  and  !.  ore  important,  only 
adjustments  of domestic prices to changing world market 
conditions can  improve  the stability of international trade, 
because the stickiness of domestic prices greatly adds to 
variability of world  commodity prices.  If all countries 
participating in international agricultural trade could 
agree to adjust their domestic prices to changes  in world 
prices,  world markets  would  be  much  more  stable.  Hence,  the 
need  for protection against fluctuating  international prices 
would  be greatly reduced.  To  the-extent that exchange rate 28 
changes  indicate changing  international  comparative 
advantages,  there are good  reasons to adjust domestic 
markets to  such changes.  Finally,  because it is always 
difficult to distinguish between short-run fluctuations  and 
changing trends,  protection against price and  exchange rate 
"fluctuations"  always  is in danger of creating added 
protection. 
However,  in spite of these valid economic  arguments 
most policy makers  prefer to protect domestic markets 
against the  influences  of international fluctuations.  Hence, 
the acceptability of  a  PSE  approach might well  depend  on  the 
scope it leaves  for domestic price stabilization.  But 
international prices could be very unstable if countries 
were  completely free to pursue domestic policies without any 
regard whatsoever to where  international prices move  in the 
medium  to long term.  From  this point of view the  issue is 
what the appropriate  (and  acceptable)  degree of 
responsiveness  of domestic policies to international price 
movements  should be,  or what  the appropriate time period 
should be  over which countries can  "average"  their domestic 
policies in relation to international price changes. 
An  approach that would  bind countries not to exceed 
their given  PSEs  on  any particular day would certainly not 
be  acceptable to most  agricultural policy makers  (although 
this is exactly what  happens with bound tariffs).  On  the 
other hand,  if a  bound  PSE  were  to relate only to the 
average of a,  say,  ten-year period,  responsiveness of 29 
domestic markets  to what  happens  in international trade 
would  be  close to non-existent.  Something like an  approach 
of  "averaging"  over  a  three-year period might  be  an 
acceptable  compromise.  countries would  then have to move 
domestic policies in parallel to  a  three-year moving  average 
of world market prices. 
PSEs  would  be measured year by year.  But  to establish 
a  country's  "record",  its average  PSEs  of the most  recent 
three-year period would  be  compared with its PSE  bindings. 
This would  mean that countries would  always  have to 
"remember"  their actual  PSEs  of the most  recent two  years 
when  they  come  to take decisions  on this year's policies.  If 
they have  exceeded their PSE  bindings  in the past two  years, 
they would  have to make  sure that they adjust this year's 
policies enough to bring their average  PSE  for the three-
year period  down  to the bound  level. 
An  agreement to this effect might be  enough to offset 
the problem of fluctuating world prices and  exchange rates. 
However,  there can be  problems  of implementation.  In 
particular,  during any particular year world prices could 
drop  so  much  that contrary to best intentions the three-
year average  PSE  (including the last two  years)  ends  up 
being higher than the  bound  level.  Since it will  never be 
possible to determine whether the government  of the country 
concerned really had  "best intentions"  to  remain within its 
allowed  PSE  range,  there will have to be unequivocal 
procedures  for  such situations. 30 
Two  possibilities arise.  First,  for  any particular 
year's policy decisions,  world prices of the previous year 
would  have to be  considered.  In order to assess the three-
year average  PSE  against the  GATT  binding,  the calculation 
of the three-year average  PSE  would  then be  done  such that 
for year one  (of the three-year period)  actual world prices 
of that year would  be  used,  whereas  for years  two  and  three 
actual world prices for year two  would  be used.  Second, 
rather than basing this year's policy decisions  on last 
year's prices,  the  GATT  secretariat could publish forecasts 
of this year's world prices.  Policy decisions then would 
have to based,  in terms  of their PSE  implications,  on  ~hese 
secretariat forecasts.  The  assessment  of  PSEs  against 
bindings would  then be  done  as  in the first procedure, 
except that the secretariat's estimates would  be used 
instead of last year's prices.  This  approach would to  some 
extent have  a  precedent in the design of the  IMF 
Compensatory  Financing Facility where  export revenues of any 
particular year are assessed against  a  moving  average of 
export revenues  centered around the year under 
consideration,  i.e.,  including expected export revenues  in 
years to come. 
h)  Inclusion of Non-agricultural  Policy Effects 
If PSEs  can  be  measured to capture most  agricultural 
policies of any  significance,  the  issue arises as to whether 
the  impact  on non-agricultural policies  on  agriculture 31 
should also be taken into account.  This  question is of 
particular relevance  in situations where  high levels of 
protection in the non-farm sector have  a  signficant impact 
on  farm  costs  and  where  actual  exchange  rates do  not 
adequately reflect the underlying realities of the external 
value of national  currencies.  9 
One  can easily imagine  a  PSE  measure that represents 
the  sum  of direct policy interventions,  spill-over effects 
from  policies in other areas  (such  as  non-agricultural 
tariffs,  labor market policies,  etc.),  and  a  factor 
representing the  exchange rate distortion.  Such  a  measure 
would  give  a  more  accurate picture of total government 
policy impacts  on agriculture.  The  problem is that such  a 
measure  may  be less useful  for the purposes  of international 
trade negotiations.  GATT  Contracting Parties could well  be 
sympathetic to the needs  of  some  developing countries to 
offset through trade policies the  impacts  of their 
inappropriate macroeconomic policy.  But the objective 
should be to assist such countries to  improve both trade and 
macro policies,  rather than to validate one with reference 
to the other. 
In this sense,  it is probably better to negotiate on 
agricultural policies,  non-agricultural trade policies,  and 
macro-economic policies separately,  knowing  that they are 
interrelated in terms  of their domestic  impact.  Broadening 
9  These  two  situations are,  of course,  often linked.  High 
protection leads to exchange rate overvaluation,  which  in 
turn subsidizes  imports  and  taxes  exports. 32 
the definition of  PSEs  to include the effects of non-
agricultural policies would  only be useful if all such 
policies were  "on the table"  in the  same  negotiations.  If 
this were  not the case,  then it would  be at best confusing 
and at worst misleading to negotiate on  one  set of  PSE-
measured policies in the agricultural talks,  knowing that 
other "parts"  of the  PSE  were  being negotiated or decided  in 
a  different place. 
i)  Institutional Arrangements  for Measurement 
Another  important practical question is who  should 
measure  and monitor  PSEs.  The  obvious alternatives are 
national  institutions in each participating country or a 
central institution in a  multilateral agency. 
There are various proposals  for setting up  a  network of 
independent institutions in individual countries,  which 
would collect and  publish information on the pursuit and the 
effects of trade impacting government policies.  It has  been 
suggested that such institutions  (which  would  function like, 
for  example,  the Australian Industries Assistance 
Commission)  could regularly establish "protection balance 
sheets".  For agriculture,  such balance sheets could take the 
form  of  PSE  calculations. 
Although the establishment of  such  a  network of 
national  institutions and the  increasing transparency they 
can provide would  be  an  important advance,  it appears 
doubtful that their work  could  form  a  universally accepted 
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results of  PSE  calculations must  be  open to scrutiny by all 
parties concerned,  and the methods  applied to  PSE 
measurement  should be  as  homogeneous  across  countries  as 
possible. 
It would  therefore appear that an  international 
institution based  on multilateral agreement would be 
preferable to measure  PSEs  for agricultural trade 
negotiations.  The  GATT  secretariat would  be the most 
natu!al candidate  for this activity.  It would  have to be 
provided with adequate  resources to fulfill this function. 
Another  element  of ,the  institutional arrangement  could 
be  the establishment of an  annual  review process.  For these 
reviews all participating countries could meet  in order to 
consider the results of the secretariat's PSE  calculations, 
the progress made  in policy adjustments,  and the methods 
used  for  PSE  assessment.  Besides its potentially important 
contributions to the  functioning of the  PSE  approach as 
such,  these reviews  could fulfill an  important role in 
creating more  transparency in agricultural policies. 34 
v.  comparison with other Measures 
The  discussion so  far has  concentrated  on  PSEs  as  a 
possible measure  of the level of  farm  support.  The 
practical advantages  and disadvantages  of this measure  can 
only be  assessed in the light of other possible measures 
that might  be used  in negotiations,  and  the theoretical 
value of  PSEs  can  only be  seen by  comparing it to existing 
normative  approaches. 
One  can categorize the alternative measures  for use  in 
trade talks by the level of analysis  required.  At  one 
extreme are purely descriptive or qualitative  "measures" 
such as the domestic legislation underlying policies.  More 
quantitative manifestations of these regulations are the 
actual administrative decisions  implementing them,  including 
domestic price levels,  quota  levels,  and  quality standards. 
Along with financial  data  on policy costs,  these might  be 
said to yield "absolute" measures  in the sense that they are 
specific to a  particular country and  expressed in local 
currency. 
At  the next level of analysis are measures that require 
some  degree of comparison of domestic with international 
markets--in particular those that use world prices and 
exchange rates.  These  "relative" measures  might  seem to be 
more  controversial,  in that there is widespread  scope  for 
disagreement  on  the appropriate exchange rate or the level 
of world price to be used.  10  Nominal  protection rates 
10  A  tariff is,  or course,  a  relative measure.  Since it is 
also the administrative  instrument,  no  additional analysis 35 
(usually taken as  the relationship between  domestic  and 
world producer prices)  and effective protection rates 
(taking into account  input policies by  comparing value  added 
at domestic  and  world prices)  are of this type.  The  PSE  is 
also  a  relative measure  in the  same  sense, although in many 
instances  one  can  avoid direct use  of world-domestic price 
comparisons  by making  use  of financial  data  on  budgetary 
expenditure.  The  aim is ultimately to have  an  index of 
producer incentive effects that can  be  compared  over time 
and  across  commodities  and  countries. 
The  fundamental  question is thus the extent to which 
countries  can agree  on  such  a  relative measure  rather than 
negotiating on  absolute measures  such as price levels, 
production targets,  expenditure ceilings,  export 
quantitities,  and  import quotas.  The  PSE  offers a  way  of 
customizing such  a  measure to the needs  of the trade talks. 
Effective and  nominal  rates of protection require much  of 
the  same  information to calculate and are equally vulnerable 
to controversy over exchange  rates and world prices. 
Neither of these more  established measures  handles  supply 
control policies.  They  are essentially less complete  and 
less flexible.  Nominal  protection rates have  the advantage 
of simplicity to offset their incomplete  coverage. 
Effective protection rates are neither complete nor 
is in general  needed.  It is the non-tariff nature of 
agricultural protection that make-s  a  "relative measure"  both 
essential  and  also problematic. " 
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particularly simple to calculate and  interpret--in 
particular when  free  trade value  added  is low  or negative. 
National  trade delegations  and their parent ministries 
usually will wish to take the analysis  much  further.  The 
"relative" measures  themselves  are the inputs  into models 
that simulate the changes  in market balance  and  in the 
profits of various  sectors as protection is varied.  The 
"analytical" measures  of policy effects,  such as the 
quantitative  impact of policies on trade  flows,  require 
knowledge  of behaviorial parameters  (supply  and  demand 
elasticities).  It is unlikely that there would  be  enough 
agreement at the international level to allow negotiation on 
the basis of measures  dependent  on elasticity values.  Such 
analysis will probably remain the province of individual 
governments  and  of academics. 
The  same  comment  is even more  true of the  "ultimate"  in 
measurement  of policy effects,  the  impact  on  real  income  and 
its distribution.  Such welfare  and efficiency studies are 
invaluable  in indicating the magnitude  of the problem and 
the gains  from  removing  impediments  to mutually beneficial 
trade.  They  are less well  suited to balancing domestic  (or 
international)  costs and benefits in the political market 
place of votes  and pressure groups.  Even  national 
delegations do  not  always  make  use of welfare calculations 
to formulate their negotiating positions,  though  such 
studies may  well  influence the underlying strategies. 37 
In such  a  hierarchy it is clear that PSEs  are  intended 
as  a  pragmatic approach  to defining  a  measure  more 
meaningful  than producer price levels alone,  yet less 
controversial than the quantitative effect on trade.  They 
are not  a  welfare measure per se,  but they have  uses  as 
inputs  into such calculations.  They exist primarily to 
improve the transparency of domestic measures  and  hence to 
facilitate international discussion. 38 
V.I.  Concl  us ion 
The  discussion  above  appears  to lead to the  following 
conclusions: 
a)  If countries  choose  an  "across-the-board"  approach to 
the issue of negotiating on agricultural policies,  the  PSE 
has  a  number  of advantages.  Among  these are that 
-- it can  include  a  wide variety of domestic policy 
instruments,  thus putting these policies  "on the table"  for 
the first time; 
it can be tailored to exclude  "desirable"  programs, 
such as  those that decouple  income  support  from price 
incentives and  concentrate on  those that have  an effect 
on  trade; 
-- it can be modified to handle  supply control policies at 
least as well  as  any other aggregate measure; 
-- it can be  added  up  across  commodities  to give overall 
protection levels. 
-- countries would  retain flexibility to adjust domestic 
policy within the specified PSE  level; 
b)  If countries choose  negotiations of the more  traditional 
type,  with "offer and  request"  bargaining at the bilateral 
level  and  extending the concessions to all Contracting 
Parties,  then  PSEs  have  a  more  limited role.  Countries could 
choose to  frame  their requests  and offers in terms  of PSEs. 
This would  have  the  following advantages 39 
-- domestic policies would  fall within the scope of  such 
requests  in terms  of their effect on  trade; 
-- negotiations  on different commodities  could proceed 
using different methods  of measurement  and  compliance. 
c)  As  countries consider the rules  and  obligations relating 
to agriculture within the  GATT,  certain aspects of behavior 
may  be  defined in terms  of  PSEs.  These  could  include 
limits to subsidies  on  export products,  in conjunction 
with the market  share approach; 
bindings  on  "gray area"  import measures  such as 
variable levies,  together with an  agreement to subject these 
to GATT  disciplines; 
-- limits to quantitative trade restrictions,  where  these 
cannot be  removed  because of domestic policy constraints; 
-- incorporation of the trade distorting effect of state 
trading where this involves differential buying and selling 
prices. 
The  use of  PSEs  would  require considerable 
international agreement  on  issues  such  as  policy inclusion, 
treatment of supply control,  and  allowance  for  fluctuations 
in currency  and world prices.  All these issues arise with 
other possible measures,  such as  the nominal  and effective 
rates of protection:  they are  inherent in the diversity and 
reality of agricultural policies.  The  key  question is the 
political will to negotiate seriously to reduce agricultural 40 
protection.  If the will is there,  some  form  of quantitative 
measure will be  needed  and  a  way will be  found  to deal  with 
the technical  problems.  As  the  OECD  work  has  demonstrated, 
such  a  goal  is not overly ambitious.  The  next stage is up to 
governments  and  politicians to make  operational the  agenda 
agreed at Punta del  Este. 41 
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